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Abstract: This talk surveys the security threats pertinent to the optical network and outlines the 
progress and challenges in developing machine learning approaches for cognitive management of 
optical network security. © 2020 The Author(s) 
 
1. Security Challenges in Optical Networks 
As the only communications technology capable of supporting the incessant network traffic growth, optical 
networks are critical communication infrastructure carrying massive amounts of data over ultra-long distances. 
Because of their vital role in supporting services crucial for the society to function, they must be secured from 
various types of deliberate man-made attacks aimed at service disruption or unauthorized access to the carried data. 
Despite its extensive implications to overlaying communication services, optical-layer security has not been 
systematically addressed and incorporated into the overall network security management [1]. Network operators still 
lack the tools to achieve cognitive optical network security management, leaving important aspects of attack 
prevention, detection and remediation uncovered. Such a framework, supporting autonomous security diagnostics 
and management, is critical for realizing the Observe-Analyze-Act control loop to improve network performance 
and cost efficiency [2]. 
Security-oriented design of optical networks requires an assessment of various risks and attack vectors and 
incorporating this knowledge into optimization frameworks for solving complex network design problems. 
Examples of such approaches include attack-aware upgrade of the network infrastructure by sparsely adding links 
and/or nodes [3] or carefully distributing the content across a data center network [4] to alleviate the impact of 
targeted fiber cut attacks. Techniques to reduce the network exposure to harmful signal insertion attacks include 
strategic placement of devices with attack-thwarting capabilities, as well as attack-aware Routing [5] and Spectrum 
Assignment [6] under static [7], dynamic [8] and multi-hour traffic [9]. Eavesdropping attacks can be counteracted 
via encryption at various network layers – for example, using quantum shot noise-assisted ciphers at the optical 
layer [10]; or by increasing confidentiality levels via network coding and spread-spectrum techniques [11]. Network 
planning techniques to aid remediation of service disruption attacks can benefit from the identification of attack radii 
of each connection’s working path and ensuring that the backup path does not fall within range of the same attack 
[12]. While classical optimization techniques (e.g., linear programming and heuristics) have been shown to 
substantially improve optical network resiliency to targeted attacks when applied to the above problems of attack 
surface reduction and remediation, they are incapable of eliminating the threat, calling for intelligent solutions for 
cognitive and automated attack detection. 
2.  Machine Learning for Security Monitoring Automation 
Physical-layer attacks can have vastly different effects on the distinct Optical Performance Monitoring (OPM) 
parameters, which makes their detection extremely challenging. For example, a harmful jamming signal adds 
unfilterable noise to optical channels with whose spectrum it overlaps (in-band jamming), but it can also affect 
optical channels sufficiently separated from it in the spectral domain (out-of-band jamming), typically reducing the 
signal power at the received and degrading the Optical Signal to Noise Ratio (OSNR), leading to transmission 
errors. A polarization scrambling attack, in which the fiber is squeezed at a high frequency to cause fast-varying 
changes in the channel polarization state, can cause error bursts without affecting the channel power levels or 
OSNR. Encompassing experimental studies of physical-layer attacks at the optical link- and network level were 
performed in [13] and [14], respectively. Due to the complex interplay among different OPM parameters and the 
absence of models capable of capturing these effects or even consistent observable trends in OPM parameter values 
for different attack regimes, it is not possible to rely on a threshold-based approach for detection and identification 
of physical-layer attacks. Even more so, the use of pre-determined thresholds as triggers for (re)configuration 
actions is considered unreliable, ineffective and unscalable in the forthcoming transition towards cognition-driven 
automation of network planning and management workflows urged by network operators [15].  
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Due to their ability to process massive amounts of data and identify intricate patterns among a great number of 
performance indicators without the need to explicitly specify models or parameter thresholds, machine learning 
(ML) techniques are highly suitable for optical layer security diagnostics. ML has been applied to the detection of 
unauthorized signal presence by scrutinizing the received optical spectrum [16], and to the detection and 
identification of in-, out-of-band jamming and polarization scrambling [13,14], demonstrating strong potential to 
perform these functions in runtime environments. Despite this huge potential, carrier-grade deployment of ML 
techniques is still in its infancy and many challenges need to be overcome before achieving cognitive and 
autonomous optical network security management. 
The choice of suitable ML techniques and their adaptation to runtime environments in Software-Defined Optical 
Networks is not trivial. It should take into account the requirements and performance of ML in terms of their 
accuracy, granularity of the diagnostic information they can provide, their applicability to novel emerging threats in 
the evolving network and security landscape, the complexity of their learning and/or inference phases, memory and 
processing requirements, etc. For example, as shown in [14], supervised learning techniques (e.g., Artificial Neural 
Networks, ANNs) can provide highly accurate and fine-granular information on the type and intensity of physical-
layer attacks, learned through training. This comes at a trade-off of a relatively complex training phase, relying on 
abundant, representative data labeled by experts with prior specialist knowledge on the attack specifics, and the need 
to retrain upon admittance of a new connection or an emergence of a new type of threat. However, once trained, the 
inference complexity is relatively low. Unsupervised learning (e.g., Density-Based Spatial Clustering of 
Applications with Noise), on the other hand, does not perform any (re)training and hence, does not require attack-
specific training data, but identifies attacks, i.e. anomalies as outliers in the clustered data. This allows for detection 
of new, previously unseen attack methods, at the expense of being unable to provide any fine-granular information 
about the attack type. The clustering requires obtaining and processing prior data, yielding high inference 
complexity. Semi-supervised learning (e.g., one-class support vector machine) combines the two aforementioned 
ML approaches and is applicable when data labelling is too costly or infeasible, so only a small subset of the data is 
labeled. This reduces its training complexity but also incurs inability of fine-granular attack identification. The lower 
accuracy of semi- and unsupervised learning (as opposed to supervised) requires embedding extra intelligence in the 
usage of ML modules' output using observation window and threshold definition, ensemble models that combine 
multiple ML models, and symbolic models that combine specialist knowledge with ML models. 
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